We are very grateful to all discussants for their interest in our article and their comments. We will organize our response by major topics raised by them.
References to our article's bibliography will be given as e.g. [A3] , and references to the discussion's bibliography as e.g. [D26] . All formula numbers, such as (3), refer to the formulas in the article.
EFFICIENCY OF CONFORMAL PREDICTORS
As we say in the article, the two most important properties expected from confidence predictors are validity (they must tell the truth) and efficiency (the truth must be as informative as possible). Conformal predictors are automatically valid, so there is little to discuss here, but so far achieving efficiency has been an art, to a large degree, and Alexey Chervonenkis, Phil Long and Sally McClean comment on this aspect of conformal prediction.
Indeed, as Prof. Chervonenkis notices, the article does not contain any theoretical results about efficiency. Such a result appears as Theorem 3.1 in our book [A3] . We use a nonconformity measure based on the nearest neighbours procedure to obtain a conformal predictor whose efficiency asymptotically approaches that of the Bayes-optimal confidence predictor. (Remember that the Bayes-optimal confidence predictor is optimized under the true probability distribution, which is unknown to the Predictor.) This result only applies to the case of classification, and it is asymptotic. Nevertheless, it is our only step towards a 'more principled way of designing good measures of strangeness', as Prof. McClean puts it. Her question suggests the desirability of such more principled ways; we agree and would very much welcome further results in this direction.
An important aspect of efficiency is conditionality, discussed at length in [A3] (see e.g. p. 11). It would be ideal if we were able to learn the conditional probability distribution for the next label. Unfortunately, this is impossible under the unconstrained assumption of randomness, even in the case of binary classification ([A3], Chapter 5). The definition of validity is given in terms of unconditional probability, and this appears unavoidable.
However, Prof. Chervonenkis's worry that for some objects the prediction interval might be too wide and for others too narrow has been addressed in [A3] . If our objects are of several different types, the version of conformal predictors that we call 'attribute-conditional Mondrian conformal predictors' in [A3] (Section 4.5) will make sure that we have separate validity for each type of objects. For example, in medical applications with patients as objects, we can always ensure separate validity for men and women.
COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY
We are concerned with two notions of efficiency in our article: efficiency in the sense of producing accurate predictions and computational efficiency (the latter being opposite to 'computational complexity', the term used by Prof. McClean). There is some scope for confusion, but the presence or absence of the adjective 'computational' always signals the intended meaning.
Harris Papadopoulos complements our brief description of inductive conformal predictors with an interesting discussion of experimental results. It was an unexpected and pleasing finding that the computationally efficient inductive conformal predictors do not suffer accuracy loss for even moderately large data sets. His two non-conformity measures for ridge regression illustrate the general fact that different nonconformity measures can involve different degrees of tuning to the data. Another finding of [D33] and [D34] was that more tuning (as in the second displayed equation, as compared to the first, in Dr Papadopoulos's contribution to the discussion) does not necessarily mean better accuracy: it can lead to overfitting when the available data are scarce. (they were also called 'the randomness level detected by a randomness test' in Section 2). They are not probabilities and we believe should not be criticized for not being probabilities; they satisfy condition (3) and this makes them valuable tools of prediction. They allow us to make probabilistic statements (such as 'at confidence level 1 2 e, smoothed conformal predictors used in the on-line mode make mistakes with probability e, independently for different examples'). Many of David Dowe's criticisms just remind us that a P-value, as well as a confidence, in our sense, is not a probability. He says that 'for non-binary problems, this confidence seems too large', with an argument endowing P-values with a property of probabilities (they are assumed to add to one). The fact that the three lines in Figure 6 have slightly larger gradients than the corresponding significance levels is accidental and not statistically significant. After all, we have a theorem (Theorem 5.1) that guarantees validity; the deviations are well within the double standard deviation of the number of errors. (To facilitate the comparison, the actual numbers of errors at the confidence levels 80%, 95% and 99% are 1873, 470 and 107, respectively; the expected numbers of errors are 1859.6, 464.9 and 92.98, respectively; the standard deviations are 38.57, 21.02 and 9.59, respectively. In this experiment, the MATLAB generator of pseudorandom numbers was initialized to 0.) We could not report the log-loss scores for Figures 6 and 7 because the methods described in our article do not produce probability forecasts.
INTERPRETATION AND PACKAGING
The problem of valid and efficient probabilistic prediction is considered in our book ([A3], Chapters 6 and 9). We show that the 'Venn predictors' that we construct are automatically valid, but the notion of validity for probabilistic predictors is much subtler than that for confidence predictors in the practically interesting case of finite data sequences. (In the idealized case of infinite data sequences the asymptotic notion of validity is quite simple, and asymptotically valid probabilistic predictors are known as well-calibrated predictors.) Unfortunately, it was impossible to include this material in our talk and article.
To finish our reply to Dr Dowe's contribution, the randomness test used in Table 1 is given by formula (5) with the a i computed using the support vector method with the polynomial kernel of degree 5 (as we say in the text); in Section 4 the randomness test is the one implemented by the ridge regression confidence machine (as we say both in the text and in the figure captions).
As Xiaohui Liu points out, a key issue for hedged prediction is how to assist users with the interpretation and utilization of our measures of confidence. The full information about the uncertainty in the value of the label to be observed, as given by a conformal predictor, is provided by the full set of
Even in the case of classification, this set has to be somehow summarized when the set Y of potential labels is large. Our preferred way of summarizing the set fp Y : Y [ Yg is to report two numbers: the confidence (defined by (8) or, equivalently, as one minus the second largest P-value) and credibility (9) (equivalently, the largest P-value). Prof. Chervonenkis suggests replacing confidence with the difference between the largest and the second largest P-values. In combination with credibility this carries the same information as our suggestion. The pair (confidence, credibility) still appears to us simpler and more intuitive, but we believe that this is a matter of taste.
WHAT IS RANDOMNESS?
To motivate the definition of conformal predictors we start the article from the notion of randomness. Alan Hutchinson's comments give us an opportunity to discuss further terminological and philosophical issues surrounding this notion.
The word 'random' is loaded with a plethora of different meanings. Several years ago we even tried to avoid it altogether in our lectures and articles, using 'typical' instead. But the noun 'typicalness' was so awkward and both 'random' and 'randomness' so well established that we reverted to the old usage. Kolmogorov, who started the modern stage of the theory of randomness, was only interested in randomness with respect to the uniform distribution on a finite set, and in this case the word 'random' (as well as its Russian counterpart 'smuyako9k') matches the common usage perfectly. Later on, his followers started generalizing Kolmogorov's concept to arbitrary probability measures and statistical models; although the mismatch between the technical and ordinary senses of the word 'random' became apparent, the term was not changed.
We think that Part 1 of Mr Hutchinson's answer is very well illustrated by Dr Long's aphoristic statement that 'in many applications, one expects randomness between examples and structure within them'. A 'seemingly random training set' is a bad starting point if there is too much randomness within examples, but randomness between examples helps: it enables us to make provably valid stochastic statements about the future. Another point we would like to emphasize is that we do not have to learn the true probability distribution P to make good predictions (as repeatedly pointed out by Vladimir Vapnik in [A1] and [A2]); in fact, conformal predictors, despite producing reasonable predictions, do not provide us with any information about P.
As Mr Hutchinson says, our initial reaction to his idea of a computable universal randomness test was that such a test is unlikely to exist except in very simple and uninteresting cases. This impression was based on our experience so far (for a given computable test it is usually easy to find another computable test that is much more powerful on some data). However, our experience only covers a small part of machine learning, and it is by no means our intention to discourage research in this direction.
REJOINDER

PHILOSOPHY
Prof. Vapnik asks our opinion about philosophical aspects of transductive inference. To a large degree, we are his pupils on this subject (the reader can consult his books [A1, A2] and the afterword to the second English edition of his classic [1] ). It appears that the role of transduction is constantly increasing. The muddle-headed transduction, to borrow David Bell's delightful metaphor, is obviously the right way of reasoning in the complex social world surrounding us. But even in physics, the traditional abode of the most general and precise rules (physical theories), pure induction encounters serious difficulties: we have two very general sets of rules, quantum mechanics and general relativity, but they contradict each other. Induction appears to be becoming subordinate to transduction; for example, as in this article, induction might make transduction more computationally efficient. At this point it is useful to remind the reader that this article always makes the assumption of randomness. The general ideas such as induction and transduction become incomparably more manageable. This is a very simple-minded world: the usual philosophical picture of constant creation of and struggle between scientific theories (e.g. [2] , [A10]) becomes irrelevant. But we have to start somewhere.
As Prof. Bell can see, despite our interest in transduction, our paper is still very much simple-minded. In its current embryonic state all rigorous machine learning has to be such, and it is likely to stay this way for some time. The only thing we can hope to do now is to nick a few interesting topics here and there from more muddle-headed areas such as experimental AI or philosophy, and try to prove something about them.
PREDECESSORS OF CONFORMAL PREDICTION
This topic was raised by Glenn Shafer. Of course, the vast majority of our comments are not new to him, and they are mostly addressed to people who are not experts in this field. Indeed, our work is closely connected to that of Kei Takeuchi and his predecessors mentioned by Prof. Shafer: Sam Wilks, who introduced in 1941 the notion of tolerance regions, Abraham Wald, who in 1943 extended Wilks's idea to the multidimensional case, and John Tukey, Donald Fraser, John Kemperman (and many other researchers), who in the 1940s and 1950s contributed to generalizing Wald's idea.
From the very beginning of the theory there were two versions of tolerance regions, which we might call inductive (involving two parameters, denoted e and d in our article) and transductive (involving only one parameter). We will be discussing only the latter version.
Let e . 0. A function S e mapping each training set to a subset of the example space Z is called a conservative e-tolerance predictor if the probability of the event z lþ1 [ S e ðz 1 ; . . . ; z l Þ is at least 1 2 e (for all sizes l and for independent and identically distributed examples z 1 , . . . , z lþ1 ). In practice one usually considers systems of conservative e-tolerance predictors S e , e [ (0, 1), which are nested: S e 1 # S e 2 when e 1 e 2 . For brevity, we will refer to such systems of conservative e-tolerance predictors as tolerance predictors.
The parallel between tolerance predictors and valid confidence predictors is obvious. For example, given a tolerance predictor S we can define a valid confidence predictor G by the formula So what do the conformal predictors contribute to the theory of tolerance regions?
The most important contribution of conformal prediction is perhaps the general definition of non-conformity measures. In our book ([A3], p. 257) we describe a version of an important procedure due to Tukey for computing non-conformity scores (using our terminology). However, it appears to us that Tukey's procedure (and its predecessors due to Wilks, Wald and several other researchers) can be used efficiently only in the case of traditional low-dimensional statistical data sets, and to process data sets that are common in machine learning one needs the general definition, as given in this article. An important advance towards the general definition of nonconformity measures was made by Takeuchi in the recently found manuscript [3] , a hand-out for his lecture at Stanford University in 1979. According to the information we have been able to gather after Prof. Shafer's talk at the discussion of our article, the chronology of events seems to be slightly different from his description. The Stanford lectures (or lecture) happened in the late rather than early 1970s (namely, in July 1979), after the publication of [A22] in 1975. To our knowledge, Takeuchi's idea of non-conformity measures for multi-dimensional tolerance regions has never been published, even in Japanese. We are lucky to have the three-page hand-written manuscript [3] . Takeuchi's definition of non-conformity is rather narrow (based on parameter estimation), and he does not state it formally; he gives only one example of its use in a multi-dimensional situation. However, there is little doubt that if Takeuchi had continued work in this direction, he would have arrived at the general definition.
For a much fuller historical account, including our predecessors in machine learning (but not including [3] , which was found only in July 2006), see [A3], especially Section 10.2.
APPLICATIONS IN MEDICINE AND BIOLOGY
Zhiyuan Luo and Tony Bellotti describe in detail the use of conformal predictors in medical applications; we have little to add to their very clear description. Medicine appears to be an especially suitable field for this technique. Consider, for example, the problem of automated screening for a serious disease. We would like to declare a person clean of the disease only if we are confident that he or she really is; if we are not, the test results should be passed on to a human doctor. The guaranteed validity of automated screening systems based on conformal prediction is obviously of great value; even if such a system is badly designed, this will be reflected in its efficiency (extra work for human doctors), but the patients can be assured that validity will never suffer. This guarantee depends, of course, on the assumption of randomness being satisfied, but in this particular application it appears reasonable.
In biological applications, the most natural use of conformal prediction is to filter out e.g. uninteresting genes. Prof. Liu discusses the difficult problem of setting thresholds for deciding when a gene should be passed on to a biologist for a further analysis. There might not be universally applicable principles for making such decisions. The whole process of analysis might involve several iterations, with the thresholds lowered or raised depending on the results obtained.
ASSUMPTIONS
Prof. Shafer eloquently points out the narrowness of the assumption of randomness (called the iid assumption by several discussants). We agree that it is rather narrow (and one of us has been concerned since the late 1980s with prediction free of any stochastic assumptions: see e.g. [4] , [A6]), but we will start from its defence.
The assumption of randomness is non-parametric. No assumptions whatsoever are made about the probability distribution generating each example. In many situations this assumption is close to being satisfied; think e.g. of a sequence of zip codes passing through a given post office (over a period of time that is not too long). It is an interesting and widely applicable assumption.
Besides, it is clear that some stochastic assumption is needed in order to obtain valid stochastic measures of confidence. Taking into account the strength of guarantees that can be derived, we find the assumption surprisingly weak. In Chapter 8 of [A3] we further generalize the method of conformal prediction to cover a wide range of 'on-line compression models', and in Section 8.6 we derive conformal predictors for the Markov model (cf. numbers 2 and 3 on Prof. Shafer's list).
It can be counted as a disadvantage of conformal prediction that it depends heavily on the assumption of randomness. Our discussion will be general, but we will couch it, for concreteness, in terms of support vector machines. The support vector method can also be said to depend on the assumption of randomness: the theorems about support vector machines obtained in [A1] -[A2] always make this assumption. What is important in typical applications, however, is not the theorems but the predictions themselves, which are more precise for support vector machines than for many other methods. Support vector machines can always be applied and the results will be useful unless the assumption is violated dramatically. Of course, conformal predictors can also be always applied, but the measures of confidence are an integral part of their predictions, and the validity of these measures is much more sensitive to violations of the assumption of randomness (or assumptions expressed by other on-line compression models).
Drago Indjic raises the question of applying confidence and credibility to active experimental design. In the limited framework of this article, the objects x n , being components of the iid examples, are themselves iid. Active experimentation destroys this property. If this article's approach were followed, one would need relatively long sequences of iid examples between active interventions, and this appears wasteful. Combining active experimental design with confidence and credibility without waste would require developing a suitable on-line compression model, perhaps a version of the Gauss linear model ([A3], Section 8.5).
The topic of experimental design is continued by Glenn Hawe. The analogy between two-stage/one-stage varieties of cost-effective optimization and induction/ transduction is striking, but implementing his idea will again require a different on-line compression model. The assumption of randomness, so central in our article, is quite different from the assumption of 'low bumpiness'. Finding a suitable on-line compression model might not be easy, but it is definitely worth pursuing. Dr Long's idea of using conformal prediction in reinforcement learning also requires another on-line compression model. A good deal of further work is still needed.
This brings us back to the limitations of the assumption of randomness. It makes many applications (active experimental design, reinforcement learning) problematic. The assumption can be weakened or modified (see [A3] for numerous examples), but it is always good to have at our disposal methods of prediction that do not depend on any stochastic assumptions. As Prof. Shafer says, such probability-free methods are being actively explored in prediction with expert advice (also known as 'universal prediction of individual sequences' and 'competitive on-line prediction'), with some recent breakthroughs. In many applications (such as typical medical applications) the assumption of randomness is convincing and the measures of confidence provided by conformal predictors are really needed. In other areas, particularly those in which no human intervention is envisaged, conformal prediction is less useful, and if, additionally, the assumption of randomness is violated, the case for prediction with expert advice becomes very strong.
